Dr Jeffrey Haynes, Professor Emeritus of Politics, London Metropolitan University, UK
By Professor Jeffrey Haynes
The third Russia-Africa Summit, which took place in Moscow in October 2026, underlines a structural shift in Global South diplomacy. Informed by a complex mix of anti-western rhetoric, pragmatic transactionalism, and agency-driven non-alignment, the summit marks a sea change in Russia relationship with African countries, including Ghana. As the prolonged conflict in Ukraine intensifies Moscow’s international isolation, the Kremlin increasingly relies on the traditional ‘soft power’ of historical Soviet anti-colonial solidarity to position itself as a normative alternative to Western hegemony. By framing Western engagement as inherently predatory and neo-colonial, President Vladimir Putin employs a targeted ideological discourse with two aims: delegitimise the liberal international order, of which Ghana is a long-standing member, and present Russian state-backed trade and technological partnerships as mutually beneficial arrangements devoid of paternalistic conditionalities.
What’s in it for Russia?
African states, including Ghana, are not passive recipients of Russian influence. Nor are they are mere pawns in a renewed geopolitical Cold War. High African visibility at the summit – evidenced by the presence of 48 country delegations and 22 heads of state, including President John Dramani Mahama – reflects a calculated strategy of what might be called ‘diversified non-alignment’. This approach allows regional actors, including Ghana, to maximise their political leverage by navigating a multipolar environment. While Moscow seeks symbolic legitimacy and diplomatic counter-weights against Western sanctions through optics and narrative-shaping, African governments, including that of Ghana, are pursuing concrete, fragmented national interests. For some, particularly the military-led regimes in the Sahel, this translates to crucial security-for-resources arrangements managed by state-directed apparatuses like the Africa Corps. For other African leaders, including President Mahama, it is a pragmatic mechanism to secure vital agricultural, energy, and diplomatic concessions without choosing a single external patron.
What’s in it for Russia? Russia’s political and security presence in Africa is not matched by its trade with the continent. Trade was estimated at $27 billion in 2025, far below the $40 billion target Moscow set in 2019. President Putin has now set a new target: over $50 billion. China and the European Union are far larger trading partners with and for Africa. China-Africa trade reached about $348 billion in 2025, while EU-Africa trade was greater still: $395 billion.
Agriculture is one area where Russia has established stronger commercial ties. President Putin announced Russia exported 13 million metric tons of agricultural products to Africa in the first nine months of 2026 and highlighted fertilizer supplies.
Energy is another area of cooperation, though projects remain at different stages. Russia’s state nuclear company, Rosatom, is building Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant. At the summit, President Mahama announced that Ghana would build a nuclear power plant, with Russian assistance.
At the summit, President Putin also promoted digital cooperation and local production of medicines and vaccines. Turning these proposals into tangible results will require investment, production facilities and skills.
Moscow’s promises and Africa’s calculations
The summit ended with a joint declaration, an agreement on civilian artificial intelligence and a 2027–2029 Russia-Africa action plan.
The African Union Commission and Russia signed a cooperation plan covering security, trade, energy, agriculture, health, education and technology. The Commission says it is a framework, not a legally binding agreement.
Overall, progress will depend on whether the commitments receive funding, clear institutional responsibility and deadlines. African governments are navigating a harsher international environment. The summit indicates that they are finding ways to use it to their advantage, widening their options and pressing established partners to improve their offers.
What in it for Ghana?
During the summit, Ghana secured a major industrial manufacturing agreement alongside enhanced academic and political commitments.
The primary tangible gains for Ghana include a bauxite and alumina industrial deal. The Russian aluminium giant Rusal agreed to develop a brand-new bauxite mine at Nyinahin in the Ashanti Region. The project is projected to produce up to five million metric tons of raw bauxite annually. Second, there was agreement regarding domestic refining infrastructure. As part of the mining package, a new alumina refinery will be constructed with the capacity to process 1.2 million metric tons of alumina per year. This supports the mission of the Ghana Integrated Aluminium Development Corporation (GIADEC) to transition Ghana from exporting raw minerals to establishing localized processing, driving job creation and upgrades to port and rail logistics.
There was also an agreement in relation to academic partnerships. The Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) proposed launching a dedicated Russian-African studies programme to expand educational scholarships and bilateral research initiatives for Ghanaian students.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Russia-Ghana agreement was in relation to nuclear power. President John Mahama used the bilateral platform to push forward proposals for nuclear power plant cooperation, seeking alternative, sustainable energy solutions for Ghana’s domestic grid.
In the next article, I will explore the pros and cons of Ghana constructing a nuclear power plant with Russian technical assistance
About The Author
